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AZIZ CASE AND UNFAIR CONTRACT
TERMS IN MORTGAGE LOAN
AGREEMENTS: LESSONS TO BE
LEARNED IN SPAIN*
Immaculada Barral-Viñals**
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an overview of the judgments given by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) concerning unfair contract terms
(UCTs) in mortgage loan agreements. My analysis of recent ECJ
decisions will focus on three aspects. First, focusing on the consumerfriendly interpretation of the UCT Directive,1 which has led to the
development of substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness, most
notably in Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa.2 Second, I will identify various points
at which the Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be
revised. Third, I will focus on the possibility of controlling UCTs in
mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
This article’s approach will be based on a comparison of
developments in ECJ decisions and recent decisions by Spain’s
Supreme Court, the Tribunal Supremo (T.S.). This comparison
indicates that the T.S. has adopted an interpretation rule for mortgage
loan agreements that is far from consumer-friendly. This finding is

The final version of this text was ended on October 15, 2014.
University of Barcelona; ibarral@ub.edu.
1
Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) (EC).
2
Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).
*
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supported by decisions made by the T.S. on May 9, 2013,3 a month and
a half after the ECJ decision in Aziz, and September 8, 2014.4
The “social engineering” that emerges from ECJ decisions is a
clear indication of the situation in Spain today, where judges seek
preliminary rulings concerning the scope and interpretation of the
UCT Directive to develop principles for a more consumer-friendly
interpretation of mortgage foreclosure proceedings.5 The lower courts
in Spain are taking the lead to further develop these principles to
protect consumers in real estate transactions, because the Spanish
legislature and the T.S. seem reluctant to do so in what has become a
major concern of Spain’s social policy.6 For instance, the most farreaching legislation requires renegotiation of mortgage terms only
when “low-income borrowers” are involved.7 “Low income
borrowers” is a category that varies in the different statutes but which
is highly limited in scope to include only those with very low or none
incomes, and a high average of the rent used in paying the loan (more
than 60%).8 The ultimate option in this case for this category of
consumers is the datio pro soluto, i.e., providing the same effects as
non-recourse loans available in the United States, which affects an
even smaller group of borrowers. Besides carving out an exception for
this small, unique group of consumers, legislation reforms have
focused chiefly on what constitutes unfair contract terms.

S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R. J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).
5
See JOSÉ MARÍA FERNÁNDEZ SEIJO, LA DEFENSA DE LOS
CONSUMIDORES EN LAS EJECUCIONES HIPOTECARIAS (2013).
6
Hans-W. Micklitz, Unfair Contract Terms—Public Interest Litigation before
European Courts—Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz, in LANDMARK CASES OF EU
CONSUMER LAW: IN HONOUR OF JULES STUYCK 615 (Evelyne Terryn, Gert
Straetmans & Veerle Colaert eds., 2013).
7
See Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E.
2012, 60) (Spain); Urgent Measures to Strengthen Protection Measures to Mortgage
Debtors (B.O.E. 2012, 276) (Spain); Rights of Persons with Disabilities and their
Social Inclusion (B.O.E. 2013, 289) (Spain) [hereinafter Rights of Persons with
Disabilities].
8
Id.
3
4
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This article seeks to ascertain the consequences of ECJ Aziz
case on UCTs.9 My main goal is to examine the way in which the ECJ’s
interpretation of UCTs has given rise to the construction of a
substantive concept of unfairness by analysing standard contract terms
(SCTs) included in almost all mortgage loans granted in Spain.
Further, this paper will focus on the way in which these non-binding
clauses can result in a stay of foreclosure proceedings and can also
reduce the mortgager’s debt. Indeed, UCTs in Spain today constitute
an indirect remedy against foreclosure, which can dramatically impact
medium to low income families.
I. UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS: WHY THEY SEEM TO BE A USEFUL
TOOL IN MORTGAGE LOAN AGREEMENTS
SCTs often used in mortgage loan agreements are considered
a means of unilaterally fixing contract clauses. As such, SCTs
significantly limit freedom of contract, a notion embodied in the term
“free will” in Article 1255 C.C.10 The seller or supplier of mortgage
loans fixes SCTs in advance, and the borrower must accept or reject
them on a “take it or leave it” basis. Since SCTs are not individually
negotiated, they are subject to both an incorporation and a fairness test
when the adherent－the non-professional party－is legally considered
a consumer.11 In Spain, SCTs are governed by two different
regulations, depending on whether the adherent is a consumer or not:
the Standard Contract Terms Act of 1998 (Ley de Condiciones
Generals de la Contratación (LCGC)),12 which governs SCTs in any all
kinds of contract, and the General Law for the Protection of
Consumers (consolidated by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2007, Que
Aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de
Consumidores y Usuarios y Otras Normas Complementarias

9
I will not conduct an in-depth analysis of mortgage foreclosure
proceedings, which is the main issue raised by Aziz.
10
C.C., art. 1255 (2011) (Spain); Elena Lauroba Lacasa, Rapport Introductif:
Les Clauses Abusives, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES, SOCIETE DE LEGISLATION
COMPAREE 9 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud & Elena Lauroba eds., 2013).
11
General Law for the Defense of Consumers and Users (B.O.E. 2007,
287) (Spain) [hereinafter TRLGDCU].
12
General Conditions of Contract (B.O.E. 1998, 89) (Spain) [hereinafter
LCGC].
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(TRLGDCU)),13 which only applies to business-to-consumer (B2C)
contracts. For contracts that do not involve consumers, if the adherent
has knowledge of existence of SCTs in the contract, the contract will
be binding on both parties, even if the adherent has not yet read or
understood the SCTs. As such, the law deals only with the external
control of SCTs by employing the incorporation test, under which
SCTs may be considered part of the binding contract if the adherent
has had the possibility of knowing that the contract contains SCTs. 14
The incorporation test also applies when a contract containing SCTs
involves a consumer. However, a fairness test is an additional internal
control applied with respect to the content of the SCTs. This test
determines whether there is a significant imbalance between parties’
bargaining power so that and if an SCT is deemed unfair, it will not be
binding on the consumer.15
The Spanish legal framework in relation to UCTs has not
evolved due to the economic crisis of 2008, except in one aspect:
Article 27 of Act 3/201416 referring to the non-revision of a UCT,
which is explored further below. However, the ECJ’s ruling in Aziz
lead to the Act 1/2013 of 14 May,17 on measures to strengthen the
protection to mortgagors, debt restructuring and social rent that had

TRLGDCU (B.O.E. 2007, 287).
However, the adherent’s acceptance does not imply that he has actual
knowledge of the material scope of each term. Whether the SCTs are incorporated
as part of a binding contract depends on “accessibility” of the adherent to the SCTs.
Thus, it is unreasonable to uphold that the adherent has consented to the content of
the STCs, since the existence of a possibility for the adherent to know the STCs does
not necessarily mean that the adherent has made an informed decision. See EUGENIO
LLAMAS POMBO, COMENTARIOS A LA LEY GENERAL DE DEFENSA DE
CONSUMIDORES Y USUARIOS 284 (2005).
15
A further condition for enforcing SCTs is that they must be drafted in
plain, intelligible language and have an interpretation contra proferentem, i.e., the
supplier must assume the consequences of confusing wording. A lack of
transparency is a ground for non-incorporation, since confusing clauses cannot form
part of a contract. LCGC art. 5, 7 (B.O.E. 1998, 89). This idea is developed further
in the T.S. judgment of 9 May 2013, S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013)
(Spain), which seeks to construe unfairness in terms of a lack of transparency.
16
See Consumer Protection Act (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain).
17 Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social Rents
(B.O.E. 2013, 116) (Spain) [hereinafter Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt
Restructuring and Social Rents].
13
14
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modified the Mortgage Act (Ley Hipotecaria –LH-)18 and the Code of
Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil) with regard to the
consequences for mortgage foreclosure proceedings when the
mortgage loan agreement contains clauses or terms that are be deemed
unfair. Although various ECJ cases have redefined Spanish legislation
on UCTs in mortgage agreements,19 these cases are contrary to the May
9, 2013 decision issued by the T.S., which has generated considerable
controversy. The practical impact of these ECJ judgments on SCTs is
of great importance, since the majority of mortgage loan agreements
in Spain contain STCs.
The lower Spanish courts—Audiencias provinciales—have
examined a number of frequently used SCTs in mortgage loan
agreements that might be deemed unfair, including SCTs relating to:
(1) the early maturity of the loan, (2) the default interest rate, (3) the
unilateral determination of the amount owed, and (4) the so-called
“floor clause” in variable interest loans. In Aziz, the ECJ ruled on the
fairness of the first three types of SCTs. Preliminary rulings by the ECJ
focused on two aspects: the criteria to be applied in examining the
fairness of a clause and the effects of an unfair clause. Similarly, the
T.S. has ruled on the “floor clause,” which is a problem only in Spain
in the context of the UCT Directive concerning the scope of
application of the fairness test to the main subject matter of the
contract.
We start by examining this latter point as a prius for the analysis
of the above-mentioned clauses.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIRNESS TEST TO THE MAIN
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT
An initial set of ECJ and T.S. decisions deal with the
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature. Article
Mortgage Act) (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain) [hereinafter Mortgage Act].
Case C-484/08, Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R.
I-04785; Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito v. Joaquín Calderón Camino,
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274 (June 14, 2012); Case C-415/11, Mohamed
Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013); Case
C-226/12, Constructora Principado v. José Ignacio Menéndez-Álvarez, 2014 EURLex CELEX LEXIS 7 (Jan. 6, 2014).
18
19
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4(2) of the UCT Directive states that the assessment of the unfairness
of a contractual term should not include the “main subject matter of
the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration . . . as
against the services or goods supplied in exchange . . . .”20 As such, the
ECJ has been requested to give a preliminary ruling as to whether it is
actually possible to assess the fairness of the subject matter of the
contract and the adequacy of the price and remuneration in light of the
value of the services or goods supplied in exchange, that is to say, the
fairness of the contract price.
The question is whether the transposition of the UCT
Directive by the Spanish legislature complies with Article 4(2) of the
Directive, given that Spanish law has not expressly transposed this
limit to the assessment of fairness. This question was answered by the
ECJ in Caja de Ahorros de Madrid v. Ausbanc.21 The Court in Ausbanc held
that a Spanish law providing for an assessment of the fairness of terms
relating to the main subject matter of the contract was consistent with
the UCT Directive.22 The ECJ determined that Article 4(2) is not a
binding provision. Member States may opt not to transpose Article
4(2) and, in so doing, may afford a higher level of protection than that
established by the Directive.23 This option satisfies the requirement in
the UCT Directive of “minimum harmonisation” of national
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
See Ausbanc, 2010 E.C.R. I-04785.
22
In Ausbanc, the T.S. requested the ECJ make a preliminary ruling
regarding the unfairness of a SCT that allowed the bank to round up the interest rate
in a variable mortgage agreement to the next quarter of a percentage point. See id.
23
It follows from the wording of Article 4(2) of the UCT Directive that
“[Article 4(2)] . . . cannot be regarded as laying down the scope ratione materiae of the
Directive.” Id. at I-4837. Article 4(2) cannot be inferred as constituting “a mandatory
and binding provision and that, as such, its transposition by Member States was
obligatory. On the contrary, the Court merely held that, in order to safeguard in
practice the objectives of consumer protection pursued by the Directive, any
transposition of Article 4(2) had to be complete, with the result that the prohibition
of the assessment of the unfairness of the terms relates solely to those which are
drafted in plain, intelligible language.” Id. at I-4838. Further, the Court in Ausbanc
stated that “it must be held that, in authorising the possibility of a full judicial review
as to the unfairness of terms such as those referred to in Article 4(2) of the Directive,
provided for in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer,
the Spanish legislation at issue in the main proceedings makes it possible for
consumers to be afforded, in accordance with Article 8 of the Directive, a higher
level of protection than that established by that directive” Id. at I-4838.
20
21
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legislation.24 A number of decisions by the T.S. adhere to this
interpretation of the UCT Directive, as I will explain. Notably, prior to
Ausbanc, the T.S. had already ruled in a manner consistent with the
ECJ’s holding. For example, in T.S. judgement of 1 July, 2010,25 which
concerned clauses defining risks in insurance contracts, the T.S. ruled
that courts should assess the fairness of clauses related to the main
subject matter of such contracts because it determines the price of the
insurance.
Yet, more noteworthy is the judgment against this
interpretation, since it deals with mortgage contracts, bearing in mind
that only a clause unrelated to the subject matter of the contract or the
adequacy of the price can be submitted to the unfairness test. Thus,
the question is that the T.S. resolution of 18 June, 2012, which is
concerned with remunerative interest rate, states that Spanish
legislation on UCTs prohibits the assessment of the fairness of
contract clauses that are related to price.26 It appears that the
remunerative interest rate, which is the main tool for calculating the
contract price, is outside the scope of the unfairness test.
Control of the remunerative interest rate clearly entails an
analysis of the adequacy of the contract price, since the assessment of
the nominal interest rate applied is the “price” of the loan. No
assessment of fairness, however, is undertaken in fixing this rate.
Instead, fairness is assessed as to the price agreed to by the parties.
This conceptual separation of Article 4(2) of the UCT Directive of the
control of the price as the main subject matter of the contract, and the
adequacy of the price and the remuneration, on the one hand, as
against the services or goods supplied in return, on the other, was
highlighted by the ECJ in Constructora Principado v. Álvarez.27 The nature
of unfairness does not require an economic imbalance in the contract,
which the Court understands as not being relevant. Instead, unfairness
refers to the legal imbalance created by those contract clauses that
Id. at I-4836.
S.T.S. Jul. 1, 2010 (R.J., No. 6031/2010) (Spain).
26
S.T.S. June 18, 2012 (R.J., No. 5966/2012) (Spain).
27
In Constructora Principado (like Ausbanco, a preliminary request from a
Spanish judge), the ECJ was asked to determine whether obliging consumers to pay
for expenses that by law need to be borne by the sellers is unfair. See Case C-226/12,
Constructora Principado, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 7, ¶ 44 (Jan. 6, 2014).
24
25
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impose on the consumer certain charges for which he is not liable
under the applicable law. In other words, it is unfair to create a legal
imbalance, irrespective of the economic impact on the parties.28
Spanish scholars29 have reached a consensus that UCTs are not
the appropriate tool for determining the adequacy of the contract price
and remuneration as against the services or goods supplied in return.
Spanish law calls for complete freedom of parties to determine
contract prices, and therefore, there are no remedies30 for seeking a fair
price.31 Thus, the control assessment of fairness is not about the
adequacy of the price, which is separate from the possibility of
assessing unfairness, but about the way some clauses help to determine
the total price that consumers have to pay for the loan. This is precisely
why many SCTs in mortgage loans might be considered unfair.32

See IMMACULADA BARRAL VIÑALS, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE
CONSUMO, ABUSIVAS POR DESEQUILIBRIO IMPORTANTE, PERO NO IMPORTA LA
CANTIDAD (2014) (detailing a discussion on legal imbalance not being an economic
imbalance in the ECJ decisions).
29
See SERGIO CÁMARA LAPUENTE, EL CONTROL SOBRE LAS CLÁUSULAS
“ABUSIVAS” SOBRE ELEMENTOS ESENCIALES DEL CONTRATO 71 (ThompsonAranzadi ed., 2006) (discussing the tension between unlimited freedom to negotiate
the contract price and social justice).
30
An exception to the general rule that no remedies exist for seeking a
fair contract price is the laesio ultra dimidium in Catalonia for immovable property
under certain circumstances. This exception, however, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
31
See IGNASI FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, PABLO IZQUIERDO WHITE,
ADELA RODRIGUEZ SERRA & GUILLEM SOLER SOLÉ, CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA
CONTRATACIÓN BANCARIA 86 (2014) (calling for the impossibility of controlling the
price by the fairness test). Nevertheless, the argumentation cited deals precisely with
the idea of adequacy between the price and the services and goods supplied. See also
LAPUENTE, supra note 29, at 71 (discussing the liberal doctrine of freedom of pricing
and the social justice of the contract). However, we understand that the thesis of
social intervention of the contract exceeds the issue of unfair terms and seeks, not
to determine whether there is an imbalance in a specific contract, but rather to restore
a prior balance when starting from the premise that both parties have very different
powers of negotiation.
32
Article 32 of the Directive on Consumer Rights inserts Article 8 to the
UCT Directive, stating that when a Member State adopts provisions in accordance
with Article 8, it must inform the Commission, especially if those provisions “extend
the unfairness assessment to . . . the adequacy of the price or remuneration.” Council
Directive 2011/83, on Consumer Rights, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EU), amending
Council Directive 93/13, supra note 1, and Council Directive 1999/44, 1999 O.J. (L
28
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In terms of remunerative rates of interest, it should be stressed
that control of the amount, if any, is concerned directly with assessing
the adequacy of the service provided against the remuneration. In
short, the control of the amount impacts pricing freedom. Article 1 of
the Repression of Usury Act of 23 of July 1908 governs the
determination of whether the remunerative rate of interest is excessive
or not.33 The Usury Act is useful for controlling the adequacy of the
loan price because it mandates that the lending of money cannot be
considered binding where there is an “interest notoriously higher than
the normal price of money or clearly out of proportion in the
circumstances of the case, or leonine. . .”34 However, when the lending
is excessive or leonine, the loan is void in its entirety. Thus, the
requirements of the Usury Act differ from the unfairness test, under
which only the unfair clauses would be non-binding. In short, there is
a specific tool in Spanish law for analysing when the price of the loan
is excessive, namely, the adequacy of the price, which lies outside the
scope of laws that address UCTs.
An important case that addresses the issue of price control is
the Judgement of 9 May 2013,35 a T.S. decision which was published
shortly after the ECJ decided Aziz. The T.S. held that, although the
rate of default interest constitutes part of the main subject matter of
the contract, it can only be deemed unfair if the clause lacks
transparency. These issues are discussed below in section IV, sub171) 12 (EC), and repealing Council Directive 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 (EC) and
Council Directive 97/7, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 (EC). The Directive on Consumer
Rights was transposed by the Spanish legislature in the Consumer Protection Act,
(B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain), amending TRLGDCU. Importantly, note that Article 8
does not deal directly with the price as the main subject matter of the contract, but
rather with the adequacy of the price or remuneration.
33
Represión de la Usura (Usury Repression Act) (B.O.E. 1908, 206)
(Spain) [hereinafter Usury Repression Act].
34
Nevertheless, the main idea of the Usury Repression Act is to provide
a subjective approach by taking into account the personal characteristics of the
debtor in determining whether the loan is usurious or not. See Immaculada BarralViñals, Freedom of Contract, Unequal Bargaining Power and Consumer Law on
Unconscionability, in UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE (Mel Kenny, James Devenney &
Lorna Fox O’Mahony eds., 2010) (relating the concept of unconscionability in
common law and how this Act might be considered the first Spanish law protecting
the weak part of the contract).
35
S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain)
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section C in conjunction with the criteria for determining fairness,
because unlike remunerative interest rates, default interest rates do not
form part of the price. Instead, default interest rates are part of the
compensation for the eventual damage suffered by the creditor
because of non-payment. In other words, these rates fall outside the
notion of price and, as such, are susceptible to an unfairness test.36
These T.S. cases permit application of the fairness test to any
kind of clause in a mortgage loan, and this application should be the
first step in considering individual clauses typically included in
mortgage loan agreements in Spain.
III. SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA FOR DEALING WITH THE CONCEPT OF
“UNFAIRNESS”
The ECJ has issued a number of guidelines on determining the
fairness of SCTs. These guidelines are only of persuasive authority for
judges in national courts because the Court in Luxembourg only gives
instructions to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation
of the scope of the fairness control provided in the UCT Directive.37
In Aziz, however, the ECJ provided national courts with direct
guidance—which has been cited in subsequent cases such as
Constructora Principado—for analysing SCTs. All in all, the ECJ analyses
36
MARIA CARMEN GONZALEZ CARRASCO, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE
CONSUMO, LA CLÁUSULA QUE IMPONE UN INTERÉS DE DEMORA
DESPROPORCIONADO DETERMINA LA APRECIACIÓN DE OFICIO DE LA NULIDAD
DE LA MISMA SIN POSIBILIDAD DE ONTEGRACIÓN JUDICIAL(2013).
37
The judgments that stress the idea that the ECJ only gives instructions
to the referring court in accordance with the interpretation of the scope of the
fairness control provided in the UCT Directive are numerous. See Case C-243/08,
Pannon GSM Zrt. v. Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi, 2009 E.C.R. I-04713; Case C-137/08,
VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ferenc Schneide, 2010 E.C.R. I-10847; Case C-92/11,
RWE Vertrieb AG v. Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 4659 (Mar. 21, 2013). A summary of this construction can be found
in Case C-472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt.,
2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4104 (Apr. 26, 2012) (“it is for that [national] court
to determine, in light of those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is
actually unfair in the circumstances of the case . . . . It is thus clear that the Court of
Justice must limit itself, in its response, to providing the referring court with the
indications which the latter must take into account in order to assess whether the
term at issue is unfair.”).
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three different clauses used in virtually all mortgage loan agreements.
These clauses are discussed separately below.
A. The “Early Maturity of the Loan” Clause
The “early maturity” clause is an SCT that confers on the bank
the right to call in the totality of the loan on expiry of a stipulated time
limit where the debtor fails to fulfill his obligation to pay any part of
the principal or the interest on the loan. This clause implies the
acceleration of the loan due to any kind of non-compliance. The ECJ
in Aziz referred to this clause as the “acceleration clause.”
There is considerable variety of early maturity clauses used for
a range of circumstances, such as when a debtor enters into insolvency
proceedings and in the sale of an immovable property. The discussion
in this section focuses on the type of early maturity clause considered
in the case brought before the ECJ: one that provides for early maturity
on account of non-payment of a loan installment. For this clause to
take effect, there must be a failure to comply with an obligation that is
of essential importance in the contractual relationship, such as nonpayment in due time by the borrower.38 But, the substantive issue
discussed by the ECJ was the early maturity that occurred, or could
occur, as a consequence of the non-payment of a single installment,
and whether the early maturity clause may be considered unfair
because of being disproportionate. The problem is not the possibility
of calling in the loan because of the debtor’s non-compliance. Rather,
the problem is the imbalance between the term and the amount of the
loan, and the non-payment of a single installment.39 Some Spanish
scholars argue that, since early maturity for non-compliance is
authorized by Spanish regulations on UCTs,40 the central problem is
whether absolute non-compliance can be assumed after defaulting on
just one installment.41 The meaning of non-payment is not defined in
See, e.g. S.T.S., Dec. 16, 2009 (R.J., No. 8466/2009) (Spain).
See PASCUAL MARTÍNEZ ESPIN, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO,
ES ABUSIVA LA CLÁUSULA DE VENCIMIENTO ANTICIPADO POR IMPAGO DE UNA
CUOTA DE LA HIPOTECA (2013).
40
TRLGDCU art. 85(4) (B.O.E. 2007, 287).
41
See Carlos Ballugera Gómez, Carácter Abusivo del Vencimiento Anticipado
por Impago de una Sola Suota del Préstamo Hipotecario en la STS de 16 de Diciembre de 2009,
7507 DIARIO LA LEY 10, 10 (2010); Maria Teresa Alonso Pérez, Cláusulas Frecuentes
en Préstamos Hipotecarios para Adquisición de Vivienda: Cláusula Suelo, Cláusula de
38
39
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the regulations. However, the ECJ provides three criteria –marked in
bold- for determining whether the non-compliance is sufficiently
serious: “whether that right is provided for in cases in which such noncompliance is sufficiently serious in the light of the term and amount
of the loan, whether that right derogates from the relevant
applicable rules and whether national law provides for adequate
and effective means enabling the consumer subject to such a
term to remedy the effects of the loan being called in.”42
Even though the ECJ does not conclude whether this clause is
unfair, its criteria reflects the normal circumstances of a mortgage loan
for a family home in Spain. Typically, banks in Spain grant mortgage
loans with pay back time of at least thirty years.43 As such, nonpayment of a single monthly installment, without more, does not
appear to be a severe violation of the borrower’s payment obligation.
In line with these criteria, the Spanish legislature set a limit on
the maximum delay of payment, beyond which would indicate a
serious intention of the borrower to breach his payment obligation. In
2013, the legislature promulgated Act 1/2013,44 which modifies Article
693(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to require a finding of noncompliance with the loan agreement based on non-payment of
monthly installments for three or more months or its equivalent if the
terms are not quantified in a monthly basis.
Act 1/2013 also takes into account the second criterion
provided by the ECJ, and addresses the question of whether the right
to call in the loan for the non-payment of one installment derogates
from the relevant applicable rules. If there is no early maturity clause
in the contract, the mortgage can only be executed following the
“essential non-compliance” in the terms provided by Article 1124
C.C.,45 which seems to require more than the non-payment of a single
Vencimiento anticipado y Cláusula de Cntereses Moratorios Excesivamente Elevados, in
VIVIENDA Y CRISIS ECONÓMICA 183 (María Teresa Alsonso Pérez ed., 2014).
42
L.E. CIV art. 693(2) (Spain).
43 See, e.g., Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EURLex CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013) (the mortgage loan at issue was for thirtythree years).
44
See Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social
Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).
45
C.C. art. 1124 (Spain).
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installment. Thus, by specifically requiring three months of nonpayment, Act 1/2013 establishes a criterion in which non-compliance
is of essential importance.
However, the last criterion provided by the ECJ on the need
to examine whether there are adequate means to remedy the effects of
the clause is largely ineffective. Article 693(3) of Code of Civil
Procedure clearly provides for the possibility of the debtor thwarting
the execution of the mortgage by paying the due installments, a power
conceded to the debtor of the mortgage on the family home, without
the consent of the creditor. Therefore, in light of the effectiveness of
reacting to the implementation of the clause, the Spanish legal system
provides reasonable solutions to ensure the clause is not deemed
unfair.
Act 1/2013 establishes that, in the absence of non-payment for
at least three months, the judge cannot proceed to foreclosure.
However, the question remains as to whether, even if the bank has
declared the loan is expired after the minimum time limit for
compliance established by law, the contract contains a clause for early
maturity for non-payment of a single installment. Courts are likely to
declare this clause unfair and therefore not binding on the debtor, in
which case there would be a stay on mortgage foreclosure due to the
lack of necessary procedural prerequisites, i.e., the credit has not fallen
due.46 Here, however, judges must decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the elements listed above for determining whether a clause is
unfair are present. In fact, the Code of Civil Procedure does not make
early maturity clauses unfair only upon one or two non-payments.
Instead, the Code of Civil Procedure only limits the foreclosure of the
mortgage to three unpaid installments, which indicates a poor
understanding of the judgment in Aziz.
B. The Clause for Unilateral Quantification of the Amount Owed
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed allow
banks to immediately and unilaterally determine the balance of a loan
by submitting a certificate indicating the amount owed. This clause is
Encarna Cordero, Y Ahora Viene lo Difícil: ¿Cómo Controlar en el Ejecutivo
Hipotecario el Carácter Abusivo de la Cláusula?, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE DERECHO DE
CONSUMO 26 (2013).
46
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essential to the security provided by a mortgage because it provides the
creditor with recourse to the procedures set out in Article 572(2) of
Code of Civil Procedure.47 Article 572(2) requires providing for the
presentation of certification of the amount owed, duly verified before
a notary, to determine the outstanding balance to proceed to
enforcement. If such certification does not exist, the enforcement
proceedings cannot be initiated owing to the absence of one of the
procedural requisites, viz., the liquidity of the debt.48 Prior to the
enforcement proceeding, the debtor would be required to initiate a
declaratory proceeding to establish the amount due. Therefore, the law
allows unilateral declaration to establish the liquidity of the debt.
Clauses for unilateral qualification of the amount owed might
seem unfair because they require only unilateral declaration by the
bank. However, such a clause whose requirements and effects are
provided for by procedural legislation49 can hardly be considered unfair
provided that all the requirements and effects of the clause are clear.
In fact, this was the approach used by the Advocate General in Aziz,
which highlights the essential character of this type of SCT for
initiating enforcement.50 He also pointed out the need to analyze the
rules of this procedure and, in particular, the debtor’s power of
challenge, which appears guaranteed when claiming more than is due
as regulated in Art. 558 Code of Civil Procedure.51
Aziz, however, deviates from Advocate General opinion for
analyzing the procedures of mortgage enforcement proceedings and
directly adopts the comparison with national legislation in the absence
of an agreement.52 Yet, without a unilateral determination clause,
L.E. CIV.art. 572(2) (Spain).
See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLENA, supra note 31, at 175.
49
L.E. CIV. art. 572 (Spain).
50
See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).
51
L.E. CIV. art. 558 (Spain).
52
Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS, at ¶ 75 (“With regard, finally, to
the term concerning the unilateral determination by the lender of the amount of the
unpaid debt, linked to the possibility of initiating mortgage enforcement
proceedings, it must be held that, taking into account paragraph 1(q) of the Annex
to the directive and the criteria contained in Articles 3(1) and 4(1) thereof, the
referring court must in particular assess whether and, if appropriate, to what extent,
the term in question derogates from the rules applicable in the absence of agreement
47
48
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enforcement proceedings may not be initiated, so, this SCT is clearly
carrying consequences detrimental to the consumer. Therefore, Aziz
indicates that the unilateral declaration of the amount is unfair, since
this requires an agreement that derogates the applicable law. In the
absence of an agreement, the law provides for the creditor to initiate
declaratory proceedings to settle the debt, thus losing the advantages
of the mortgage enforcement, which is one of the lender’s most
obvious advantages. Enforcement based on unilateral declaration of
the amount owed offers few safeguards for the debtor, because
unilateral declaration does not contain a phase in which objections
might be lodged, nor is it corrected by the intervention of the notary.
In short, in light of Spanish procedural law, it seems more effective to
address the issue of the clauses for unilateral qualification of the
amount owed from the perspective of the guarantee of procedures
rather than from that of the unfair nature of the clause itself.
C. Disproportionate Default Interest Rate Clause
The disproportionate default interest rate clause is also
analyzed in Aziz. Unlike the remunerative rate of interest, which forms
part of the price, the default interest is the price (compensation) for
the debtor’s failure to pay, which derives from the default and is
provided for under Article 1108 C.C.53 Thus, as indicated in Section
III, the critical issue is not whether it is possible to control the content
of the clause. Rather, the issue is whether the interest rate is
disproportionate, and because of that, become unfair.
The ECJ opined in Aziz that the rate of default interest should
be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of its objectives: so, a
disproportioned default interest rate cannot be imposed because it
settles a disproportionate compensation. The ECJ establishes two
criteria for establishing a proportionate default interest rate: first, a
comparison with what is provided for under national law in the
absence of any agreement; and second, the rate of default interest
applicable in art. 1108 Civil Code.54 Clearly, the agreement of a default
between the parties, so as to make it more difficult for the consumer, given the
procedural means at his disposal, to take legal action and exercise rights of the
defence.”).
53 C.C. art. 1108 (Spain).
54
See Aziz, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS,¶ 74 (“regarding the term
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interest rate alters the legal framework under Article 1108 C.C., which
provides that the legal interest rate should be four percent,55 a figure
that is well above the usual percentage in mortgages. The question is
what standard of comparison should be employed, and there are at
least three possible answers: first, to take Article 1108 C.C., which
establishes the legal interest rate of borrowing in the event of no
agreement,56 as a point of reference; second, to apply in accordance
with Spanish legislation the limit on the legal interest rate of tacit
overdrafts on personal loans subject to Article 20(4) LCC,57 which is
2.5 times the legal interest rate;58 and third, to compare the
remunerative rate of interest of the loan itself with the default interest
rate.
Consumers often default on their loan payments at the risk of
foreclosure proceedings and find themselves unable to pay high rates
of default interest. Therefore, RD-L 6/2012, before providing a ruling
in the Aziz case, determined an upper limit for default interest rate in
mortgage foreclosures affecting debtors with few resources (Article 4
RD-L 6/2012).59 This regulation provides for the so-called “debtor on
the threshold of social exclusion,” who enjoys special protection and
concerning the fixing of default interest, it should be recalled that, in light of
paragraph 1(e) of the Annex to the Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 3(1)
and 4(1) of the directive, the national court must assess in particular, as stated by the
Advocate General in points 85 to 87 of her Opinion; first, the rules of national law
which would apply to the relationship between the parties, in the event of no
agreement having been reached in the contract in question or in other consumer
contracts of that type; and, second, the rate of default interest laid down, compared
with the statutory interest rate, in order to determine whether it is appropriate for
securing the attainment of the objectives pursued by it in the Member State
concerned and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them”). See also Case
C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse, Katarine de Man Garabito v. Jahani BV,
2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2538 (May 30, 2013).
55
State Budget 2014 (B.O.E. 2013, 309) (Spain) (stating the state budget
for 2014. Additional disposition 32).
56
C.C. art. 1108 (Spain).
57
Consumer Credit Act art. 9 (B.O.E. 1995, 72) (Spain) (derogated by
Consumer Credit Act (B.O.E. 2011, 151) (Spain) [hereinafter Consumer Credit Act].
Neither of the two statutes apply to mortgage loan agreements.
58
See FERNÁNDEZ DE SENESPLEDA, supra note 31, at 145. This criterion
has been followed by provincial courts seeking a limit in the default interest rate in
the face of recent legal reforms.
59
Urgent Measures to Protect Low Income Mortgage Debtors (B.O.E.
2012, 60) (Spain).
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is limited to the remunerative interest agreed to by parties at the time
of making the loan agreement plus 2.5% of the loan principal.
Nevertheless, the requirements for being recognized as this type of
debtor are cumbersome and complicated, and few debtors are deemed
eligible for this protection.
The ceiling on default interest in Article 114 LH, amended by
Law 1/2013 limits default interest to a rate that is three times the
statutory interest rate when the mortgage is for the acquisition of the
main residence and the mortgage agreement has been secured on that
residence. Thus, a solution was implemented to depart from the
statutory interest rate provided by the C.C. and to increase the ceiling
on personal loans. Today, there is a legal limit on interest rates when
the rate has been agreed to in a new mortgage contract. Hence,
disposicion trasitoria (DT) 2 of Act 1/2013 applies this limit to
foreclosures that are pending or to be initiated after the effective date
of Act 1/2013 that will have a greater impact as a lot of cases can be
in its scope of application.60 This indicates that the court clerk or
notary will recalculate the rate of interest if it exceeds the statutory
limit. As such, DT 2 of Act 1/2013 seems to represent an effort to
moderate the clause in opposition to ECJ case law and the provisions
in Article 85 TRLGDCU, which will be further discussed in Section V
below.
Another interesting aspect of disproportionate default interest
rate clauses concerns the proceedings taken when an interest rate is
declared unfair and therefore void. The provincial courts have adopted
two approaches to this issue. The first approach is to apply a zero
interest rate if a court declares the default interest rate void as
disproportionately high and the judge is unable to moderate the clause,
as demonstrated in Section V. The second approach is to apply Article
1108 C.C., which provides that, in the absence of an agreement
between the parties, the rate of default interest shall be the statutory
interest rate. I favor this second approach because the supplementary
application of Article 1108 C.C. does not constitute a revision of the
clause, but only a use of the statutory interest rate in the absence of an
agreement between the parties, defined as lack of foresight or
60
See Measures to Protect Mortgagees, Debt Restructuring and Social
Rents (B.O.E. 2013, 116).
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unenforceability by other cause.61 The logic of Article 1108 C.C. is to
provide a model for the quantification of the legal obligation for paying
default interest, which is used by the ECJ as a reference for finding
unfairness. The agreement on a default interest rate modifies the
application of this precept.62
D. The “Floor” Clause
In Spain, most loan agreements for purchasing a family home
charge a variable interest rate. A “floor” clause affects the variability of
a loan by providing a fixed interest rate. Floor clauses do not allow
lower rates of interest to be applied, even if a lower rate is available
under the Euribor or other mechanism of calculation. Financial
institutions use floor clauses to protect themselves against possible
falls in the Euribor. Hence, the potential unfairness of floor clauses
has been called into question because such clauses cause an imbalance
in the contract, since the debtor is unable to benefit from interest rate
cuts lower than the limit established by the floor clause, and it can be
deemed unfair because the lack of financial knowledge of the debtor
means he may be unaware that the clause might be applied, which has
occurred during the present economic crisis. Although the ECJ has not
addressed the fairness of floor clauses, the T.S. ruled on this issue in
the May 9, 201363 and September 8, 2014 decisions64 and applied much
more restrictive criteria.
The T.S. cases considered floor clauses from two points of
view. The first, which is contrary to the interpretation by the ECJ in
Aziz, is that “floor” clauses, insofar as they determine the contract
price, cannot be considered unfair. The second is that floor clauses can
only be considered invalid for lack of transparency. Thus, the test for
fairness is its inclusion within the loan agreement (Articles 5 and 7
LCGC and 80 of TRLGDCU), which is understood to be made when
See Miguel Martin Casals, Les Clauses Abusives Dans le Projet de Cadre
Commun de Reference, in LES CLAUSES ABUSIVES: APPROCHES CROISEES FRANCOESPAGNOLES 73 (Yves Picod, Denis Mazeaud, & Elena Lauroba eds., 2012) (pointing
out that the contract remains when a clause is unfair either because the clause is not
essential to the contract’s purpose or because the law includes a defective application
of the norm. In our case, the defective norm is C.C. art. 1108).
62
See GONZALEZ CARRASCO, supra note 36, at 4.
63 See S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
64 See S.T.S., Sept. 8, 2014 (R.J., No. 3903/2014) (Spain).
61
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the bank complies with all previously established information and
documentation requirements.65 Surprisingly, the T.S. checks the
transparency of contractual clauses that cannot be deemed unfair as
they form part of the price in function of the criterion of transparency
in what is known as “double filter transparency”. Indeed, this criterion
for the transparency of contract clauses is not contemplated by Article
82 TRLGDCU, which is limited to requiring only that the content of
the clauses shall not be “contrary to the requirement of good faith” or
“cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer and user.”
Nor does Article 3 of the UCT Directive require a check on the
transparency of contract clauses. Thus, the transparency control in
Spanish law is effectively a control of the incorporation of general
contract conditions, and not a control over the fairness of the SCT. 66
Indeed, the control of accessibility tackles the issue of fairness more
directly than the control of transparency because the former is based
on whether the consumer had the opportunity of knowing the content,
while the latter is only a posterior analysis of whether the clause is
worded clearly or not. Further, even if the wording of the contract term
is unclear, it will be ineffective rather than unfair.67
In practice, the T.S. adopts the ECJ’s interpretation of the
concept of unfairness due to a lack of transparency, which provides
that the clarity of the contract language requires the lender to fulfill its
affirmative duty of supplying sufficient information for the consumer
to appreciate the circumstances related to contract formation. 68 This
requirement is grounded in the idea that the test for unfairness should
require that consumers understand the economic significance of the
contract terms. This is precisely the concept that the T.S. adopts in
65 See Orden Sobre Transparencia de las Condiciones Financieras de los
préstamos hiptecarios (May 5, 1994) (B.O.E. 1994/112) (on transparency of the
financial conditions of mortgage loans or credits) (derogated by Orden
EHA/2899/2011, de Transparencia y Protección del cliente de servicios bancarios
(Oct. 28, 2011) (B.O.E. 2011/261) (on transparency and protection of bank clients)).
66
FRANCISCO PERTÍÑEZ VÍLCHEZ, LAS CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS POR UN
DEFECTO DE TRANSPARENCIA (2004).
67
See Consumer Protection Act art. 10 (B.O.E. 2014, 76) (Spain)
(amended to require clarity with the material delivery of the conditions).
68
See Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra
note 37; Hans-W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival
of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD), 51 C.M.L.R. 771, 771-808 (2014).
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determining the lack of transparency: the floor clause is void due to a
lack of transparency because such a clause prevents the consumer from
understanding the economic significance of the loan. However, the
problem is that both transparency and reporting obligations to
highlight the economic significance of the contract are for the ECJ,
examples of substantive criteria for determining the unfair nature of a
clause because they generate imbalance and are contrary to good faith,
regardless of the clarity of writing. In other words, the argument of the
economic importance of the contract is useful, but then we talk about
content control, which is precisely what the T.S. rejects at the
beginning of its argument, indicating that the floor clause refers to an
essential contract element. In my opinion, it is more useful to start
from the fact that floor clauses are unfair terms, and avoid the question
of transparency because the content control would address the fairness
issue in a more direct manner.
IV. ON THE EFFECTS OF UNFAIRNESS: NON-REVISION AND FULL
RESTITUTION
Another important issue concerns the difference between the
way in which the Spanish legislature and the T.S. interpret the effects
of unfair terms and the doctrine established by the ECJ. First, until
2013, the TRLGDCU had authorized judges to integrate terms that
had been declared unfair. Second, the T.S., in its 9 May, 2013
decision,69 stated that the law did not require restitution of the amounts
paid under a “floor clause” that had been declared unfair due to a lack
of transparency. Here, the discussion will focus on these two points:
the non-revision of an unfair contract term, and the restitution effect
when it is declared unfair.
A. Non-revision of an Unfair Contract Term
An even more surprising issue that arises from the
transposition of the UCT Directive by the Spanish legislature is that
Article 85 of RD 1/2007 allowed Spanish courts to revise unfair
clauses. However, as reported in a number of ECJ judgments,70
69
70

S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
Case C-76/10, Pohotovosť s. r. o. v. Iveta Korčkovská, 2010 E.C.R. I-

11557.
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revision of UCTs by courts is not permissible under Article 6 of the
UCT Directive.71
In 2014, the Spanish legislature amended the TRLGDCU: L
3/2014, which transposes the 2011 Directive on consumer rights,
provides in Article 27 that unfair terms are null and void and cannot
be revised by judges: Article 27 amends Article 83 of TRLGDCU. So,
judges are not permitted to revise unfair contract terms because the
supplier or seller bears the risk of the use of the clause, i.e., the supplier
or seller cannot benefit from a partial implementation of the agreement
when the clause is unfair.72
This subject is currently of great interest because of its effects
on default interest clauses. Besides what has been discussed regarding
the application of the statutory limit provided in art. 1108 C.C. in the
absence of agreement, there is another controversial provision, the DT
2 1/2013 that appears to permit revision by judges upon finding UCTs.
DT 2 1/2013, which amends Article 114 LH, grants the court clerk or
notary the power to authorize the creditor to recalculate interest if the
clerk or notary finds that the default interest clause exceeds the
statutory limit in C.C. This rule, the constitutionality of which has been
questioned,73 seems to permit the revision of a term that is no longer
See, e.g., Case C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v. Joaquín
Caldéron Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX Lexis 4274 (June 14, 2012). “Article 6(1)
of Directive 93/13 cannot be understood as allowing the national court, in the case
where it finds that there is an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or
supplier and a consumer, to revise the content of that term instead of merely setting
aside its application to the consumer.” Id. at ¶ 71. In addition, it is for the court to
ascertain what which national rules are applicable to the dispute and to take the whole
body of domestic law into consideration and apply the interpretative methods
recognized by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that Article 6(1) of Directive
93/13 is fully effective and achieves an outcome consistent with the objective
pursued by it. Id. at ¶ 72. See also Case C-282/10, Dominguez v. Centre Informatique
du Centre Ouest Atlantique, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4658, ¶ 27 (January 24,
2012). The answer to the second question is that Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13
must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as Article 83
of Legislative Decree 1/2007, which allows a national court, if it declares void an
unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer, to
modify that contract by revising the content of that term. Banco Español de Crédito
v. Joaquín Calderón Camino, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 4274.
72
See Micklitz & Reich, supra note 68, at 793.
73
Spain’s Constitutional Court has admitted application 4985-2013,
71
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permitted under Article 83 TRLGDCU. If the interest rate in the SCT
exceeds the statutory maximum, its unfairness can be assessed by the
court or the debtor can make the corresponding allegation so the
interest rate is not applied.
B. Full Restitution
The unfairness of a term might imply that the debtor has paid
more than what he should have been paid, so he is entitled to
restitution in accordance with the regulations of each Member State.
Restitution is clearly recognized by the ECJ.74 The T.S., however, has
held that the annulment of floor clauses is not retroactive, so
restitution is not warranted.75 Yet, Article 1303 C.C.76 provides that the
nullity involves recovery of benefits and that it acts ex tunc. Besides this
rather unusual ruling－or “invention”－of non-retroactive annulment,
the T.S.’s holding in judgement 9 May, 2013 has no legal basis.77 The
T.S. judgement is presenting four arguments: First, the existence of
rules that do not involve retroactivity in case of annulment, but it is
clear that in the case of unfair terms, there is no reason to deviate from
the general system. Second, the lack of transparency does not entail
annulment because the clause could be lawful. However, the reasoning
for this argument is clearly circular because the term is either unfair for
lack of transparency as held by the T.S., or the term is unfair but does
not lack transparency, in which case the law permits annulment. Third,
judges may make a retroactive revision. However, this possibility was
removed by the amendment of Art. 83 TRLGDCU, which was
promulgated after the T.S. judgment.78
Finally, the only argument of any weight, although not a legal
argument, is the “risk of serious difficulties in the economic public

presented by more than fifty members of parliament from the Socialist Group,
against this precept. Also the judge in the Avilés court of first instance (nº 7) has
presented a claim of unconstitutionality.
74
Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v. Invitel Távközlési Zrt., supra
note 37; Case C-397/11, Joros v. Aegon, 2013 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2540 (July
18, 2013).
75
S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013) (Spain).
76
C.C. art. 1303 (Spain).
77
For an impeccable analysis, see Alonso Perez, supra note 41, at 170.
78
TRLGDCU art. 83 (B.O.E. 2007, 287).
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order.”79 So, the T.S. permitted revision of the amount of the
execution, but did not allow recovery of the amounts unduly paid.
V. EXPLORING THE RESULTS OF UNFAIRNESS CRITERIA IN
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS
The most significant consequence of Aziz is the promulgation
of Act 1/2013 to reform mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Indeed,
besides the unfair nature of certain clauses, Aziz holds that the
mortgage foreclosure process, by not permitting the control of unfair
terms, is inconsistent with the principle of effectiveness in the UCT
Directive.80 Aziz also points out that the rules of Member States
contradict those of the Community if they do not provide for the
possibility of controlling unfair terms in foreclosure proceedings, or if
these proceedings cannot be suspended providing interim relief, if the
unfair nature of these terms is discussed in a declaratory judgment.81
Although the law regulates the effects of an unfair contract term in
these proceedings, the legislation on unfair terms remains the same:
the reforms have led to the redrafting of the Mortgage Act (Article
129) in those cases in which the foreclosure is made extrajudicially
before a notary. In these cases, the notary has control of the unfair
terms and has the authority to suspend the sale of the mortgaged
property if a claim on the UCT has been filed.82
For practical purposes, greater importance should be attached
to the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, which are widely
used by lawyers to identify the effect of suspending foreclosure
proceedings, although the suspension only delays the loss of the
mortgagor’s house as he is unable to repay the loan.83 Two
amendments have been made to the Code of Civil Procedure. First,
the Code directly foresees an avenue for controlling the terms by the

S.T.S., May 9, 2013 (R.J., No. 1916/2013, ¶ 293) (Spain).
See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013)
81
Id.
82
See Mortgage Act art. 129 (B.O.E. 1946, 58) (Spain).
83
Andres Dominguez Luelmo, La STJUE de 14 de Marzo De 2013:
Dificultades de Interpretación y aplicación por los Tribunales, 5 REVISTA CESCO DE
DERECHO DE CONSUMO 5 (2013).
79
80
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judge with a pre-hearing process,84 the need for which has been called
into question.85 The pre-hearing process is resolved via a judicial writ
in which the decision is made as to whether to proceed with the
foreclosure as presented given the absence of any unfair terms; or, if
unfair terms are thought to exist, foreclosure can be denied if the unfair
term is the basis for the foreclosure or to reach an agreement, but for
a smaller amount, if the term only affects the amount.86
Second, a procedural step was introduced to enable the debtor
to invoke the unfairness of a term, which is a direct consequence of
Aziz: the possibility of objecting to foreclosure because of the
existence of an unfair term in the loan agreement.87 These proceedings
(incidente de oposicion) only permit an allegation of the unfairness of a
term that either allows the proceedings to be stayed, or for the amount
due to be modified, while all other remedies must be sought in
declaratory proceedings.88 If the judge finds the clause to be fair, the
foreclosure proceedings continue; otherwise, the judge must either
dismiss the proceedings on grounds that the term forms the basis of
the foreclosure or continue the proceeding for a smaller amount of
money.89 The first draft of this incidente de oposición only allows the bank
to appeal against the writ, which is the subject of the recent judgment
of the ECJ of 17 July 2014.90 The response of the Spanish legislature,
in this case, has been nothing short of instantaneous: RD Law

L.E. Civ., art. 552.1, 681.1 (Spain).
Alberto Lafuente Torralba, El Control de las Cláusulas Abusivas en la
Ejecución Hipotecaria: Luces y Sombras de la Regulación Legal, in VIVIENDA Y CRISIS
ECONÓMICA 232 (Maria Teresa Alonso Perez ed., 2014).
86
L.E. Civ., supra note 42, art. 561.1.3, 695.3.
87
According to Carrasco Perera a coherent solution would be to allow
the judge to arbitrate and then to open contentious proceedings, but not to duplicate
the routes available for controlling unfairness. See ANGEL FRANCISCO CARRASCO
PERERA, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE CONSUMO, LA LEY 1/2013, DE 14 DE MAYO, DE
84
85

REFORMA HIPOTECARIA Y LA ARTICULACIÓN PROCESAL DEL CONTROL SOBRE
CLÁUSULAS ABUSIVAS EN LA EJECUCIÓN HIPOTECARIA (2013).

L.E. Civ. art. 557.1.7, 695.1.4 (Spain).
Id. at art. 695.3.
90
Case C-169/14, Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo and María del Carmen
Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (July 17, 2014), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?td=ALL&language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C169/14.
88
89
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11/2014, of 5 September, amending Art. 695 Code of Civil Procedure,
allows both parties the right of appeal.91
Thus, both in the judge’s assessment of unfairness and the
incidente de oposicion, the possibility of avoiding the foreclosure process
by analysing the unfairness of the contract terms so far is discrete.
Indeed, the appreciation of the early maturity clause is the basis of this
incidente de oposición, because if the clause is declared invalid, the debt is
not due and cannot be executed; however, this SCT can hardly be
regarded as unfair. The unfairness of a unilateral declaration of a debt
clause suspends foreclosure, because the debt would have no liquidity
and cannot be executed. Moreover, neither the unfairness of the
default interest clause nor the “floor clause” permits proceedings to be
suspended. The unfairness of such clauses only results in modifications
to the amount due, and in the latter case, involving only very small
amounts relative to the sum for which foreclosure is executed, as
occurred in Aziz.
Moreover, the criteria of unfairness provided by the ECJ can
be used to determine whether a clause is unfair in declaratory
proceedings. In addition, Aziz focused on the assumption that, after
initiating foreclosure proceedings–and without the legal means to
analyze the fairness–the debtor can initiate declaratory proceedings
concerning the existence of unfair terms that lack suspensory effect of
the foreclosure proceedings. The bottom line is that the judge in
declaratory proceedings could grant interim relief92 –the staying of
those enforcement proceedings and this possibility was explicitly
accepted by the ECJ93. However, the Spanish legislature has not
addressed this issue, so the possibility of a suspensory effect in the
foreclosure proceeding continues to be of uncertain application given
the rigidity of the precepts that govern the enforcement process. This
is unfortunate because declaratory proceedings are a better forum for
discussing the scope of an unfair term than foreclosure proceedings.

Urgent Insolvency Matters (B.O.E. 2014, 217) (Spain).
See Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v. Catalunyacaixa, 2013 EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 191 (Mar. 14, 2013).
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CONCLUSION
The legal developments following Aziz on the control of
unfair SCTs have been somewhat limited. However, these
developments highlight the difference between European consumer
protection law and domestic procedural law with regard to
enforcement proceedings and have given grounds for challenging the
legal system and some lessons are to be learned:
First, in Aziz, a consumer-friendly interpretation has been
given to the UCT Directive which has led to the development of
substantive criteria for ascertaining unfairness in three SCT that almost
every housing mortgage loan has in Spain: the early maturity of the
loan, the unilateral declaration of the debt and the default interest rate.
Second, coming from Aziz, various points at which the
Spanish transposition of the UCT Directive needs to be revised have
been identified: On the one hand, the non-revision of the unfair clause
by the judge has been finally stayed by an amending of art. 83
TRLGDCU, but it still remains in the foreclosure proceedings by the
means of DT 2 Act 1/2013. That shows how the Spanish legislature
has not understood the Aziz doctrine. On the other hand, the ECJ opts
for a full restitution when a clause is deemed unfair, nevertheless that
has not been the case in the two Spanish T.S. judgements referring to
a floor clause considered unfair by lack of transparency.
Third, the possibility of controlling UCTs in mortgage
foreclosure proceedings has not become a reality. Even if Aziz states
that a way of controlling fairness should be granted in the foreclosure
proceedings, it is true that the clauses abovementioned have no deep
impact on the possibility of staying the foreclosure, and in some cases
–disproportioned default rate- are only able to low the amount of the
debt.
In short, the problem of defaulting on mortgage loan
repayments is not strictly an issue of controlling UCTs, and consumer
protection provides no more than indirect tools to stay the mortgage
foreclosure. Given that many mortgagors find themselves unable to
make their loan payments—and thus at risk of losing their homes—
shifting attention to UCT legislation has been helpful in seeking a stay
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on foreclosure proceedings and the ECJ judgements have questioned
the Spanish procedural law in mortgage foreclosures. Yet, problems
still exist in areas such as the over-indebtedness of consumers (a
question that the Spanish legislator has largely ignored); weak Spanish
legislation protecting consumer rights with regard to financial products
and the role of the Bank of Spain as regulator of the sector; and
mortgage foreclosure regulations that provide the banks with many
facilities of recovery while lenders may fail to clear their debt if the
value of their home does not cover the total amount owed. Deeper
research in these three mentioned areas is needed to find a legal
solution to unpaid housing mortgages as a whole.

95

